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Changing lenses: photography as 
counterfactual thinking 
 
There is something inefficient about photographic images. They 
never seem to show us what we want or what we thought we 
wanted them to show. In this sense alone, they feel partially 
broken or at least partially incomplete. Or to put this 
another way, images also articulate something about the 
failure of representation as a system, as well as being things 
that represent objects or stuff or events in the world.  
 
What underwrites this notion of incompleteness is a rethinking 
of the gaze. This rethinking situates the gaze around a blind 
spot. So, the gaze is not how we look, as Mulvey and Metz 
would have claimed. Instead, the gaze is concerned with what 
is absent or what is missing. It is configured not by what we 
see but by what we don’t see, what is outside of view.    
 
For Mulvey, in her use of the Lacanian gaze, the gaze is 
embodied in the camera and the position it takes functions to 
create objects of desire. However, in the correct Lacanian 
reading of the gaze, what creates desire is not the look - the 
position of the camera - but what is not seen. In this sense 
there is an incompleteness to all looking which photography is 
complicit in.   
 
In this way, what is absent from the gaze manifests itself as 
an uncertain or unrealised fantasy. Building on this, desire 
comes from imagining the possibility of the lost object – as 
Lacan would describe it, the petit object a – being somehow 
regained. 
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What all of this indicates is my starting point in that what 
is broken, incomplete or partial about photography, is the 
very thing that also motivates the Lacanian gaze. 
 
This understanding provides a fundamental shift in the way we 
can think about how photography works.  
 
Simply put, photography is often at the centre of our 
discussions and thinking about representation, and the usual 
arguments are those that focus around truth and indexicality. 
If, however, we are to take a different view, namely that 
photography fails to represent because there is always 
something missing, then its failure allows the correct notion 
of the Lacanian gaze to be re-articulated. Photography then 
moves, ever so slightly, away from being about representation 
and becomes the ground for thinking about how subjectivity is 
structured differently. We are able to focus less on how this 
or that representation depicts a set of relations and be more 
attentive to a relational configuration of photography 
overall.    
 
What is significant here, is not that photography somehow, 
suddenly, starts to not represent things. It’s just the notion 
of representation is one that usually dominates photographic 
discourse and discussion. Whereas I argue for an examination 
of photography in its wider functioning. In doing this we can 
ask more useful questions about what is actually happening to 
photography and why what is happening might have greater 
consequences and matters more. My basic assertion is that the 
failure to fully represent is a structuring principle of 
photography. But it’s one that most people who study, look at, 
or consider photography mostly chose to overlook or ignore. We 
assume a kind of visual truth where in fact we are confronted 
by the structure of something that is principally false. 
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From this model mapping photography onto a failure to fully 
represent I’d like to consider the idea of fake news. Clearly, 
fake news is not just about faked photographs or images that 
have been Photoshop-ed. And to be clear fake news does not 
provide a way to express photographic representational 
failure. Rather, fake news is an altered discourse, it’s a new 
narrative structure that has become workable or acceptable.  
 
Certainly, photographs appear comfortable supporting this new 
condition. They are still deployed to verify something’s 
existence or as they have always done, to make an evidential 
claim suggesting something along the lines of: ‘seeing is 
believing’ or ‘the camera never lies.’ However, in the case of 
fake news the tendency is for any verification to be in 
support of a lie rather than truth. In this sense photographs 
miss-represent reality by suggesting an alternative, fake, 
one. 
 
But fake photographs don’t make fake news and fake news 
doesn’t underpin the argument I’ve made for photographic 
failure. Instead we should go further to examine the 
relationship these two have. 
 
Firstly, what is the context for fake news? We can think about 
fake news through the terms that Chomsky set out in 
‘Manufacturing Consent.’ Here, Chomsky noted that when media 
bias is in favour of the status quo, we tend to experience the 
following results: 
 
1. The media is held by major corporations with interests 
and goals similar to power elite elements of society 
2. People who hold different views, or those with dissenting 
voices are rarely heard 
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3. The breadth of any debate is generally limited 
4. The official stance and institutional memory tend to 
dominate and prevail, this then becomes history 
5. People's attention is diverted away from issues about 
which they should become concerned  
 
Today though, we can see that some of these points have become 
a little more inverted: people appear to be more widely heard; 
Debate appears not as limited in the sense that Chomsky 
defines; the official line is often questioned, for example 
the various Wikileaks stories; while attention span is 
arguably shorter it tends to not always be easily diverted. 
 
Through social media and the Internet, we have a space in 
which ordinary people appear able to organise and manage 
themselves without reference to any form of higher authority. 
It is within this space that fake news has been allowed to 
evolve and grow. What we experience are multiple, personal 
versions of events. And through their mediation trust of any 
‘official’ outlets is discouraged. The line being that 
government and public bodies are somehow not telling us the 
truth. 
 
If we return to my original proposition concerning photography 
we can build an argument that suggests photographs work 
because contained within them is a particular knowledge that 
they are in some way incomplete and fallible. Thus, their 
failure to represent adequately structures a particular sense 
of their being (badly) representative. But this is rarely 
acknowledged explicitly. Furthermore, representation, always 
and necessarily, requires something additional that cannot 
easily be comprehended; something that is, ultimately, in 
excess of itself. 
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We can best understand this if we consider the functioning and 
structure of conspiracy theories or religion. Underlying any 
belief in these is the sense in which we do not know 
everything. In order for these kinds of systems of belief to 
work it is therefore necessary that there is something more to 
believe; something beyond what we can know. And we can 
understand a photograph in a very similar way. In order for 
photographs to function at all there has to be a certain 
hidden essence which is beyond our common understanding. 
 
Explaining photography or a photograph, many people would 
accept that it embodies a certain ideological position: that 
it expresses a particular view point. We may also be honest 
and state that while photography appears to be like a magical 
object, it can function, like all commodities, as an 
expression of relations between people. 
 
However, what we actually need to consider is the reverse of 
this. Namely, that while photography can be understood through 
the terms of its embodiment of social relations or as an 
expression of ideology, it is the reality, in which 
photography appears to us as some kind of magical object, that 
needs addressing. One might say that while we know that 
photographs are expressions of relations between people, do 
photographs themselves know this?  
 
We might ask, whether the expression of post-truth or fake 
news narratives is actually a manifestation of the apparent 
realisation that there never has been any age of truth. In 
this sense, the liberty or freedom not be constrained by an 
overarching or hidden truth opens up a way for non-truths to 
be given equal footing. In this sense we do not align 
ourselves with an unequivocal, or truthful narrative, instead 
we experience a certain accord only with what feels genuine. 
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Rather than measuring truth by some form of external gauge, 
truth can really only be accounted for by understanding 
something of the formal inconsistency or contradiction 
inherent in its articulation and its context. Again, here 
photography provides another crucial insight because in a 
photograph truth can be appear to be simultaneously both 
present and absent.  
 
There is inevitably a comparative measure, wherein we might 
ask does this representation look like the object it 
represents. But beyond this kind of statement there are few 
external or useful gauges of truth, especially when we only 
see photographs representationally. I argue, if there is any 
possible truth of a photographic image it lies in the 
multiple, unresolved contradictions that sustain its 
representational meaning. Of course, it is in this sense that 
we inevitably determine that there is no inner truth to 
photography. But such a conclusion is rarely developed beyond 
this deadlock. Since, to do so would have to confront that 
what exists are merely a series of contingent, 
representational, displacements. Photographs continuously 
point to something they never finally reach. This then is 
perhaps their essence, not a definitive capacity to point, but 
the infinite capacity to go on and on failing to truly 
represent. 
 
The difference between what might today be understood as fake 
news and the ‘old’ news that has always been in some sense 
fake is that for those of us who may have once believed in 
news, to subsequently discover that it may have been fake is 
to experience a certain level of alienation. Which is 
recognise that something is not as it is. Whereas by 
acknowledging fake news as having at its core untruth built 
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into it, we fundamentally are never deceived. The point is thus 
that fetishistic disavowal of ideology – I know very well but 
nevertheless – renders subjects more enslaved to ideology than a 
simple ignorance of its functioning.  
 
Perhaps then, the truest test of our post-factual times is to 
consider what truth-effect is inevitably forced upon us. One 
truth-effect would be a single, unifying consideration of truth 
with a post-truth, of fact with the post-factual. In this sense 
truth and post-truth isn’t measured against each other, rather 
it is a phenomenon in itself. Perhaps, neither position entirely 
matters. In this environment we are free to think truthfully or 
post-truthfully without disappointment since they are one and 
the same.  
 
We can see this in the continuous linking or displacement of 
images, such that we begin to understand images as referring not 
to some external formal reality but only to other images. Or 
alternatively it seems we are offered so many versions of reality 
that it is no longer valid to think of there being just one at 
all. Instead, what we are confronted with is image in its 
multiple guises.  So, photographic images are no longer ‘images 
of things;’ in the sense they were once imagined to be. Instead, 
they become a series of looping combinations, a concatenated 
folding of image onto image, an incessant demand which exchanges 
image for image.  
 
But what if there can be no unification? What if fact and post-
fact are distinct? Here we experience the enslavement to 
ideology. With the alternative reading, the truth-effect we 
experience is one of a hierarchy: opposing the authentic with 
the inauthentic, the empirical with the hypothetical. It 
suggests a certain determined nature of being wherein we might 
say ‘this is true’ or ‘this is not true.’ But this serves to 
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obfuscate the affective nature of experience in general; when 
something feels true but there may well be nothing to 
substantiate this emotion.  
 
It is fair to say that, most obviously, photography has tended 
to support the hierarchical line of thought. As such it operates 
as a mechanism which helps positions us on one or other side of 
the truth/post-truth argument: it may validate truth or even 
support some kind of post-truth. But this requires our belief 
that photographs show us or hide from us things. If we consider 
that photographs fail at showing us very much, instead they 
confirm with us their own contradiction. I know very well this 
is a photograph that shows me nothing nevertheless I accept it 
as showing me a kind of truth of something, perhaps even a fake 
kind of truth. What would be a better articulation would be to 
accept a photograph as a critique of a way of thinking. It 
comfortable allows us to both believe and disbelieve. Because 
of photography things that are seen to be post-truth or fake 
news are still entitled to a certain level of acceptance or even 
inevitability.   
 
As the cycles of (image for image) image-qua-image, truth and 
post-truth have passed and continue to pass interchangeably and 
almost unnoticed, I argue, in its complicit relationship with 
both fact and fiction, photography is the ground zero of the 
post-truth epoch. 
 
 
        
